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Abstract: Apocalyptic accounts of globalization bringing about
the end of the welfare state (and the nation state) have been
countered by political-institutionalist views of adaptation.
Such views treat globalization as an external force, or pres-
sure, rather than a set of processes that are also internalized
within nations. I argue that a more differentiated view of glob-
alization can reveal how it has unsettled welfare state/nation-
state formations. In the process, taken-for-granted meanings
and boundaries of nation-state-welfare have been destabilized.
I conclude by suggesting that these processes have made citi-
zenship a distinctive focus of political tensions and conflicts.
Keywords: citizenship; globalization; nation, neo-liberalism;
state; welfare
Résumé : Des descriptions apocalyptiques de la globalisa-
tion provoquant la fin de l’État-Providence (et de l’État-
Nation) ont été compensées par des visions institutionnelles
d’adaptation. De telles vues considèrent la globalisation
comme force externe, ou une pression, plutôt que comme un
ensemble de processus qui se passent aussi à l’intérieur des
nations. Je soutiens qu’une vision plus différenciée de la globa-
lisation peut indiquer comment elle a affecté les formations de
l’État-Providence ou de l’État-Nation. Dans ce processus, des
significations prises pour acquises et des frontières de l’État-
Nation-Providence ont été déstabilisées. Je conclus en émet-
tant l’hypothèse que ces processus ont fait de la citoyenneté un
foyer particulier de tensions et de conflits politiques. 
Mots-clés : citoyenneté, mondialisation, nation, néolibéra-
lisme, état, bien-être
This article emerges from an inter-disciplinaryencounter, exploring what happens when anthropo-
logical approaches are brought to bear on questions that
are conventionally understood as belong to other disci-
plines—in this case, politics, sociology and social policy.
It examines ways of thinking about the relationship
between globalization and welfare states and exploits
anthropological analyses to reframe these issues. This
encounter is, of course, partial and selective. These par-
ticular forms of disciplinary border crossing are enabled
by a particular orientation—a shared concern with cul-
ture. This article borrows from anthropology to enable
the “cultural turn” in social policy (Clarke, 2002). I have
two ambitions for this article. One is that it moves on the
debate about welfare states in my “home” discipline of
social policy. The second is that it intersects productively
with work in anthropology on welfare states, welfare
reform and citizenship (e.g., Goode and Maskovsky,
2001; Gupta, 2001; Kingfisher, 2002; Ong, 1999). Both
ambitions reflect a continuing belief in the value of bor-
der-crossing as a practice that enables and sustains
“rethinking” as a core element of doing academic work.1
Globalization has emerged as one of the core con-
cepts of contemporary social analysis (see the overview
in Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999, for
example). It has proved to be both influential and elu-
sive. It has been brought to bear in the rethinking of
central issues (see, for example, Appadurai, 2001;
Sassen, 2001). At the same time, it has been challenged
and critiqued as inaccurate and misleading (e.g, Hirst
and Thompson, 1999). Here I explore its significance for
thinking about the transformations of welfare states. In
the process, I will argue against reductionist and econo-
mistic conceptions of globalization propounded by both
enthusiasts and critics. This “apocalyptic” view of glob-
alization as the force of global capital/markets sweeping
all before them as they remake the world in their image
is flawed in a number of ways (empirically, analytically
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and politically). However, I will suggest that globaliza-
tion remains significant as a site for thinking about the
multiple destabilizations and dislocations that assail the
welfare state/nation-state complex (Clarke, 2004). This
will mean arguing for a more differentiated, uneven view
of globalization as unlocking old, and taken for granted,
formations of state, economy and society and creating
possibilities, and pressures, for new alignments. As
Yeates argues, globalization is a difficult issue for the
study of social policy:
Its integration into the field of social policy poses
questions about many of the assumptions, concepts
and theories that have been integral to social policy
analysis. Social policy as a field of academic study is
ill-suited to thinking beyond the nation state as its
theories and concepts were developed in a national
context. (2001: 19)
Nevertheless, globalization has been identified as a cen-
tral force in the remaking of welfare states. Globaliza-
tion has been seen as marking: the dominance of eco-
nomics over politics; the power of global capital over
nation-states; the installation of markets as dominant
institution of co-ordination; and, finally, the “end” or dis-
solution of nation-states and welfare states (these issues
are discussed more extensively in Clarke, 2001a, 2004;
and Yeates, 2001). Here I examine the relationship
between globalization and welfare states around three
focal points: 
• the argument between political-economy and political-
institutionalist conceptions of globalization and wel-
fare states (and its limitations);
• the relationship between globalization and neo-liberal-
ism as a global strategy (but one which is enacted dif-
ferentially); 
• globalization as a process that takes place inside as
well outside nation-states/welfare states.
I suggest that a more differentiated and uneven view of
globalization is necessary for understanding what has
been happening to welfare states (and nation states). I
try to show how such a view of globalization illuminates
the central and contested status of citizenship in the con-
temporary realignments of nations, states and welfare.
Globalization and the End of the 
Welfare State
Globalization’s relationship to welfare states has been
conventionally conceived as an external force or pres-
sure that acts to dissolve or undermine the welfare state
and the nation state. The “strong” (Yeates, 2001) or
“apocalyptic” (Clarke, 2001b) view of globalization iden-
tifies the power of unleashed free markets (or global
capital) to transform the world economically, politically
and culturally. The rise of the global economy, in these
accounts, dissolves barriers, blockages and borders that
might stand in the way of the free movement of capital.
Aided and abetted—or even driven—by information
technology innovations, capital becomes “hypermobile,”
shedding its local or national moorings. All societies
become subject to the same pressures. They encounter
the same economic pressures (to open their economies;
become “attractive” to investment; create flexible work-
ers). They experience the same political pressures (to
create low tax regimes; reduce “unproductive” public
spending; deregulate capital and labour markets; sup-
port capital formation and accumulation). And they are
subjected to the same cultural pressures (towards a
global/American culture of consumption). As Yeates
summarizes it:
Overall, this account of the relationship between glob-
alization and social policy stresses downward pres-
sures on welfare states and the “prising open” of
social pacts underpinning them. The influence of
“strong” globalization theory’s precepts and predic-
tions is clearly evident in the way that the content of
social policy is presented as being determined by
“external”—mainly economic—constraints, largely
beyond the control of governments; that national
political, cultural and social differences will simply be
“flattened” and social standards will plummet by the
sheer “weight” and “force” of global economic forces.
(2001: 26)
Globalization has been predominantly conceived of as an
economic process or, perhaps more accurately, a process
whose primary driving forces are economic ones. With
the dissolution of the communist bloc, the world is
increasingly envisaged as a single integrated market, in
which deregulation works in the service of “free trade.”
Such processes have called into question the role of
nation-states, national governments and their public
spending programs (including social welfare) in a num-
ber of ways. First, there has been for some time a clear
“business agenda” (Moody, 1987), in which corporate
capital has articulated its demand for “business friendly
environments” (places with low tax, low regulation, and
low cost, low risk, labour). Such demands have been
enforced by “capital flight”: the reality or threat of relo-
cating investment, industrial and commercial processes
elsewhere. Second, such concerns have been installed as
“global economic wisdom” in a variety of supra-national
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organizations and agencies (such as the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank and the World Trade Orga-
nization, see Deacon, 1997). Their policies have tended
to reinforce a vision of minimalist or “laissez-faire” gov-
ernment, centred on reducing levels of taxation and pub-
lic spending. Fourthly, the process of “economizing”
political, social and cultural realms reworks discussions
of the relations between “culture” and “economy” (e.g.
Ray and Sayer, 1999; du Gay and Pryke, 2001). Finally,
there have been strong national and transnational polit-
ical forces articulating and enforcing this vision of a
global world of free trade. Neo-liberal political ideology
has been unevenly influential but its effects have been
particularly strong in Anglophone states (the U.K., U.S.
and New Zealand, for example).2
This changing political economy has implications for
the way welfare states are viewed. The most apocalypti-
cally pessimistic view is that the new global economy has
sounded the death knell for the developed (or “Euro-
pean”) welfare state. Policies of economic and social
management are not sustainable by national govern-
ments in the face of deregulated capitalism. Ulrich Beck,
for example, has argued that
The premises of the welfare state and pension system,
of income support, local government and infrastruc-
tural policies, the power of organized labour, indus-
try-wide collective bargaining, state expenditure, the
fiscal system and “fair” taxation—all this melts under
the withering sun of globalization….(Beck, 2000: 1)
There are reasons for treating such accounts of the
end of the welfare state with some caution. One concerns
the comparative evidence for welfare state decline or
retrenchment (e.g. Kuhnle, 2000; Sykes, Palier and
Prior, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). A number of studies
have highlighted continuing divergences in national wel-
fare states, despite evidence that international pres-
sures on national governments are increasing. Kersber-
gen argues that:
Empirical evidence and historical research necessar-
ily lags behind sweeping theories. But whenever
empirical evidence is presented, there seems to be lit-
tle confirmation of radical changes induced by the
dramatic crises that the theories so forcefully proph-
esied. No doubt, the empirical studies record exten-
sively the immense pressures on, as well as the mas-
sive challenges to, the welfare state. Moreover, they
provide evidence for incremental adjustment in the
major social programmes, decreasing growth of social
expenditures retrenchment….Welfare state research
in the 1990s further documented empirically that wel-
fare states have been remarkably resistant to change
notwithstanding the mounting challenges they face.
Not surprisingly, a major explanatory problem for
these dominant welfare state theories was the per-
sistence rather than the crisis or “breakdown” of the
major institutions of the welfare state. Both macro-
and meso-institutional theories started to identify the
crucial institutional mechanisms (e.g., path depend-
ency and lock-in) that explain welfare state persist-
ence. (2000: 20)
This more sceptical view of globalization’s effects
has become firmly established in comparative and inter-
national studies in social policy (see, inter alia, Alcock
and Craig, 2001; Esping-Anderson, 1996; Gough, 2000;
Sykes, Palier and Prior, 2001). Esping-Anderson and his
colleagues conclude that “global economic competition
does narrow policy choice” but that “standard accounts
are exaggerated and risk being misleading. In part, the
diversity of welfare states speaks against too much gen-
eralization” (1996: 2). This, then, points to a second
approach to globalization and social welfare: one that
stresses political-institutional differentiation and adap-
tation. While accepting the shifting economic alignment
towards greater global integration, such studies point to
the continuing importance of national politics and insti-
tutional arrangements for choices over the shape, direc-
tion and character of welfare policies:
There are additional reasons why we should not exag-
gerate the degree to which global forces overdeter-
mine the fate of national welfare states. One of the
most powerful conclusions in comparative research is
that political and institutional mechanisms of interest
representation and political consensus-building mat-
ter tremendously in terms of managing welfare,
employment and growth objectives. (Esping-Ander-
son, 1996: 6.)
Although the apocalyptic view of globalization is
being modified in these arguments, some of the core
assumptions about the character of globalization as a
social force remain in place. While these political-insti-
tutionalist analyses have provided a valuable counter-
weight to the excesses of strong or apocalyptic theories
of globalization, they nevertheless have some significant
limitations. The following sections draw out three key
problems with the institutionalist view of globalization
and its relationship to welfare states/nation-states: 
• the view of the state and its relationship to markets (or
capital); 
• the view of globalization as a deterritorialized force;
and 
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• the view of globalization as an external or exogenous
“pressure” on nation-states.
State versus Market: Another Failed
Binary?
For both theoretical and political-cultural reasons, the
political-institutionalist literature has tended to treat
the state and the market as opposed principles of social
co-ordination. This view underpins the conception of
globalization as an external force acting on welfare
states/nation-states. The power of capital and/or the
extension of market relations are understood primarily
as a challenge to the state. The state is seen as having
developed as a countervailing power and influence to
market failure and inequality. This juxtaposition is
reflected in Esping-Anderson’s (1990) influential view of
the state as securing processes of decommodification in
welfare (taking welfare benefits and services out of the
commodified relations of the market). The juxtaposition
of the state and market in this way embodies a social-
democratic view of the state as a corrective to market
processes (and the power of capital). In some respects,
this view is the mirror image of neo-liberalism’s repre-
sentation of the market as hindered, blocked and dis-
torted by the “interference” of the state.
There are both empirical and theoretical problems
with this binary opposition. It occludes a long history of
Marxist scholarship on the state’s relationship to capital,
for instance (see, inter alia, Ferguson, Lavalette and
Mooney, 2002; Ginsburg, 1983; Gough, 1979; Offe, 1984).
Marxist theorizations have ranged from seeing the state
as “the executive committee of the bourgeoisie” (in
Engels’ phrase) to treating it as structurally bound to
the “logic of capital.” Other versions give priority to see-
ing the state as the (contradictory) site of political class
struggle (and the temporary reconciliation of conflicting
interests between labour and capital). Such studies have
pointed to the ways in which the state is systematically
implicated in the development of capital: securing the
conditions of accumulation; institutionalizing and legiti-
mating its core interests (not least in legal forms); and
attempting to create the social and political conditions
for new forms of capital accumulation (for example the
“regulationist” approach: Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2001).
These views suggest a more complicit, implicated or
articulated view of the relationship between the state
and capital than is visible in much of the globalization lit-
erature. They also indicate that capital may find some
forms and functions of the state advantageous.
These theoretical possibilities are reflected in the
compound relations that persist between states and dif-
ferent forms of capital (transnational as well as national-
domestic). Surveying this field of relations between cap-
ital and the state (which may range from enthusiastic
mutuality to grudging concessions), Yeates has argued
that:
The presentation of the state-capital relationship as
one in which capital is essentially in conflict with the
state, or hegemonic after defeating the state, is inac-
curate. It posits capital always in opposition to the
state, whereas it is more useful to see capital and
state often allied together, as well as often in con-
flict….The presentation of capital acting without reg-
ulation is also inaccurate: it is bound in various webs
of regulations and governance, which it accepts
grudgingly, attempts to circumvent and which it very
occasionally invites. Indeed transnational capital
wishes to secure the support of the state, not to
replace the state. (2001: 93)
There is a consistent problem in the study of global-
ization that occurs when “globalization-in-general”—the
complex of new alignments of nations, regions and
transnational agents linked in a series of flows, connec-
tions and disjunctures (Appadurai, 1996)—is not differ-
entiated from the neo-liberal strategy of globalization.3
This distinction is, of course, not an easy one, since the
neo-liberal strategy has been profoundly influential in
shaping “the global” in its image. Indeed, it forms the
dominant tendency within globalization, but it is impor-
tant to register that it is dominant in relation to other
tendencies and possibilities—rather than being the sole
form of globalization. Neo-liberalism is the “business
agenda” of the dominant fractions of capital (in the
financial and transnational extraction and manufactur-
ing sectors). It is the “free trade” agenda adopted by
neo-liberal governments, particularly the hegemonic
U.S. It is the “Washington consensus” of markets, flexi-
ble labour and the diminished role of governments
placed at the heart of the major supra-national institu-
tions (the World Trade Organization, World Bank, etc.).
But this is not the only “globalization.” There are flows
and conjunctures of people, ideas, cultures and politics
that co-exist (more or less uncomfortably) with neo-lib-
eral globalization in—and across—the same global
space (Appadurai, 2001; Massey, 1999).
This neo-liberal strategy does have a strong anti-
statist tendency that functions as a core rhetorical fea-
ture of neo-liberal discourse. However, we should prob-
ably be wary of taking neo-liberals at their word in a
number of ways. Anti-statism in not the same as a wish
to abolish the state—rather it involves what Jones and
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Novak (1999) nicely term “retooling the state,” reconfig-
uring it in a form more favourable to capital’s current
interests.  It also seems necessary to caution against
assuming that political strategies always work in prac-
tice (since there may be a few problems of implementa-
tion)—or that discourses describe the world (rather
than being a means of trying to make the world con-
form). Too often, studies have been willing to treat the
objectives of neo-liberalism as though they are out-
comes. Instead, it may be analytically (and possibly
politically) important to think of neo-liberalism as a
strategy that struggles to overcome blockages, refusals,
resistances and interruptions. These may be the socio-
technical problems of “control at a distance” or the “nos-
talgic/traditional” reluctance of some people to give up
valued habits, practices and spaces in the name of mod-
ernization, free trade or the new world order (see inter
alia, Appadurai, 2001; Gupta, 1998). At the same time, it
may be worth thinking about neo-liberal strategy as pro-
ducing new blockages, refusals, resistances and contra-
dictions of its own. These both get in the way of the suc-
cessful implementation of its business plan—and call
forth further “innovations” to overcome them (ranging
from new information technologies to the use of military
force, for example).
Differentiating neo-liberal globalization from other
processes and relationships makes it possible to see that
the “state versus market” focus may have obscured
other relationships—and changes. One of the domains
obscured by this focus is the domestic, private or famil-
ial realm and its articulations with both the market and
the state in the production and consumption of wel-
fare—and in the construction of types of “welfare sub-
jects” (see Lewis, G., 2000). There is a substantial lit-
erature challenging both political-economy and
political-institutionalist studies for their omission of
gender relations or for bolting them on as “residual” cat-
egories (see, for example, Langan and Ostner, 1990;
Lewis, J., 2000; Orloff; 1993; Williams, 1995). The way
that attention to socio-economic groupings (or “classes”)
has obscured gender relations mirrors the way that the
state-market focus obscures the private-domestic-famil-
ial realm. This is not surprising since the private/public
dichotomy is densely interwoven with gender distinc-
tions—both historically and in its contemporary refor-
mulations (Gordon, 1994; Hall, 1998; Kingfisher, 2002).
Nevertheless, the role of the private realm (rather than
the private sector) in the production and consumption of
welfare disrupts the conception of welfare as constituted
on an axis of commodification-decommodification that is
located in the state-market distinction (see Cochrane,
Clarke and Gewirtz, 2001). It is one more reason for
escaping the analytic confines of the state versus market
binary and there are echoes here of Ong’s (1999)
approach to thinking about the intersection of bio-poliit-
cal, capital accumulation and state regimes in the con-
struction and regulation of “flexible citizenship.”
Turning Inside Out: Globalization 
and Nation-States
At this point, I want to return to another analytic con-
struct that political-economic and political-institutional-
ist approaches share: the conception of globalization as
an external or exogenous force in relation to welfare
states/nation-states. While political-economic analyses
see globalization as dissolving the borders and capaci-
ties of nation-states, political-institutionalist approaches
see nation-states as the locus of adaptation to the exter-
nal pressures of globalization. This conception of global-
ization as an external or exogenous force rests on two
rather unreliable views of spatial formation. First, it jux-
taposes the apparently solidly rooted, territorialized,
space of nation-states with the mobile, transient and
deterritorialized flows of global capital. This juxtaposi-
tion overstates both the geographical solidity of nation-
states, and the fluidity of capital. As a number of authors
have demonstrated, even the most mobile forms of capi-
tal (in the finance sector) require “places”: to be materi-
alized, to be traded, to be serviced, to be managed and
so on: 
The global economy cannot be taken simply as given,
whether that is given as a set of markets or a function
of the power of multinational corporations. To the
contrary, the global economy is something that has to
be actively implemented, reproduced, serviced and
financed…global-economic features like hypermobil-
ity and time-space compression are not self-genera-
tive. They need to be produced, and such a feat of pro-
duction requires capital fixity…,vast concentrations
of very material and not so mobile facilities and infra-
structures. (Sassen, 2001: 262)
At the same time, nation-states are both more per-
meable and changeable than the view of them being ter-
ritorially solidly rooted would allow. This leads us to the
second problem about the spatial character of nation-
states. The “external pressure/internal adaptation” con-
ception of welfare state change mis-places globalization.
While globalization involves flows, relationships and
institutions that take place “outside” particular nation-
states (from transnational corporations to the World
Bank) as well as processes that traverse nation-states;
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these processes, relationships and institutions are also
materialised within the borders of nation-states. Corpo-
rate headquarters, production and distribution systems,
call centres, inter/transnational agencies are all territo-
rially embodied within nation-states (Yeates, 2001). So,
too, are the outputs, products and “consumables” of
global capitalism. These products may “change places,”
carrying specific material products and cultural forma-
tions to be used or appropriated in new locales. But the
producers and consumers are located within (a variety
of) territorial boundaries. Sassen captures the spatial
complexity of these changes by suggesting that the new
alignments (in this case of financial sector organizations)
are partial and multiple:
Such firms’ activities are simultaneously partly deter-
ritorialized and partly deeply territorialized; they
span the globe, yet they are strategically concen-
trated in specific places….The strategic geography of
this distribution fluidly traverses borders and spaces
while installing itself in key cities. It is a geography
that explodes conventional notions of context and tra-
ditional hierarchies of scale. It does so, in part,
through the unbundling of national territory. We can
therefore understand the global economy as material-
izing in a worldwide grid of strategic places, upper-
most among which are major international business
and financial centers. (2001: 271)
As a result, the “external pressure/internal adapta-
tion” model tries to sustain a distinction that limits our
capacity to understand the spatial realignments associ-
ated with globalization. It is possible to see fractions of
capital that are already (or wish to be) international or
transnational within the “national” space of nation-
states. It is possible to see political blocs that propound
the necessity or desirability of becoming “global” within
the “national” political formation. And it is possible to
see “national” citizens who actively seek aspects of
international, transnational and global politics and cul-
ture (from international aid, through transnational polit-
ical alliances to baseball caps). Indeed, to take one exam-
ple, one might argue that the U.K. has been dominated
by alliances of capital and neo-liberal/globalizing politi-
cal blocs, as well as providing a ready consumer market
for American cultural forms and symbols. Of course,
pointing to the U.K. being “dominated by” such neo-lib-
eral/Atlanticist orientations is not the same as suggest-
ing that these trends represent the whole of the
“nation.” Refusals of the neo-liberal global imaginary
are articulated in a variety of names (the nation;
Europe; the environment; tradition, culture, and so on).
Nevertheless, the overriding point here is that global-
ization is not a disembodied and external condition, but
is materialized within nation-states (though differently
in particular national settings).
The global-national distinction is also reflected in a
conception of differentiated national political-institu-
tional forms threatened by a homogenizing globaliza-
tion. Political-institutionalist analyses often treat nation-
states as having distinct and differentiated internal
political-institutional trajectories, these are counter-
posed to the homogenous and homogenizing trajectory
of globalization. I want to argue instead, that as national
economic, social and political formations are being
realigned in a new configuration of global relations, they
are subject to both homogenizing and differentiating
pressures. On the one hand they are under pressure to
conform to (more or less explicit and institutionalized)
demands of neo-liberal models of global political econ-
omy, or to the conditions of insertion into regional eco-
nomic-political blocs, such as the European Union. On
the other hand, they are under pressures to have a dis-
tinct, and differentiated, trading, cultural and political
identity: a “place in the world.” Hudson and Williams,
for example, have argued that the “economic” integra-
tion of the EU contains dynamics of both homogeniza-
tion and differentiation:
…these changes in the character of the EU can also
be regarded as bringing about a homogenization of its
space, seeking to establish the free play of capitalist
social relations over its entirety. At the same time,
giving wider and freer play to market forces has led
to increasing territorial differentiation within the EU.
Seemingly paradoxical, these processes of homoge-
nization are enhancing the significance of differences
between places in influencing the locations of eco-
nomic activities and the quality of people’s lives within
Europe. (1999: 8)
Both of these types of pressure intersect with, and
are articulated by, “internal” or domestic economic, cul-
tural and political blocs. Both are global in scope, and
not just European. In this section, I have tried to sug-
gest that “external/internal” conception of globaliza-
tion’s relationship to welfare states/nation-states
obscures some of the crucial dynamics of both globaliza-
tion and the trajectories of nation-states. In the follow-
ing section, I want to go further to examine the implica-
tions for the place of nation-states within the study of
social policy.
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Unsettled Formations: Nations, States
and Welfare
Viewing globalization as an internal as well as an exter-
nal dynamic in relation to nation states/welfare states
underscores the increased salience of borders in the con-
temporary world (Leontidou and Afouxenidis, 1998).
The interpenetration or mingling of the “national” and
the “global” discussed above indicate the permeability of
national borders—although this is uneven (in different
places, in relation to different sorts of object and peo-
ple). In particular, the current globalization involve new
forms and trajectories of mobility of people (as migra-
tions, diasporas, nomadism: see, inter alia, Brah, 1997;
Castles, 2000; Cohen, 1997; Gilroy, 1993). These mobili-
ties call into question the (assumed) unity of nation-
states and the “peoples” that inhabit them. Nations—
and their borders—are also on the move, as nations and
states fragment, realign or are created anew. Neither
the solidity nor the stability of nation-states can be
taken for granted politically or analytically. 
This is a particular problem for the subject of social
policy, since the nation-state is a foundational concept
(see Clarke, 1996). It is also a concept whose prove-
nance, applicability and stability are largely taken for
granted within the subject. The nation-state provides
the unacknowledged back drop for most “national” stud-
ies of social policies, politics and ideologies—the
metaphorical and literal “terrain” on which such con-
flicts and developments take place. It is also the elemen-
tary unit of analysis for comparative social policy that
underpins the exploration of the (more or less) divergent
models, principles, institutions and (more recently) tra-
jectories of national welfare systems (see, for example,
Alcock and Craig, 2001; Clasen, 1999; Cochrane, Clarke
and Gewirtz, 2001; Esping-Anderson, 1996). The grow-
ing attention to trends, transitions and trajectories
marks a  shift away from the dominance of static typolo-
gies (as the classification of difference) within compara-
tive social policy. It reflects an attempt to capture the
dynamics of welfare state change—reform, restructur-
ing, retrenchment, resistance and so on—but it does so
in ways that leave the foundational concept of the
nation-state in place. This underestimates how the
nation-state itself is implicated in the dynamics of desta-
bilization and realignment. Appadurai has argued that
one of the key sites of these dynamics is the nation-state
itself:
It has now become something of a truism that we are
functioning in a world fundamentally characterized
by objects in motion. These objects include ideas and
ideologies, people and goods, images and messages,
technologies and techniques. This is a world of
flows….It is also, of course, a world of structures,
organizations and other stable social forms. But the
apparent stabilities that we see are, under close
examination, usually our devices for handling objects
characterized by motion. The greatest of these appar-
ently stable objects is the nation-state, which is today
frequently characterized by floating populations,
transnational politics within national borders, and
mobile configurations of technology and expertise.
(2001: 5)
Here we are offered an approach to the nation-state
that sees it as traversed by different—and disjunc-
tured—flows whose effect is to unsettle or de-stabilize
its apparent stability and solidity. Indeed, Akhil Gupta
has argued that this attention to dislocations may enable
us to escape the forlorn debate for or against the “dis-
appearance of the nation-state.” This binary choice, he
suggests, may “be missing the point” because “one can
often point to persuasive evidence that leads to both con-
clusions for the same cases” (1998: 319). As with
Sassen’s view of global cities noted above, the processes
unsettling the nation-state may be partial and multiple.
But it is worth re-tracing some steps backwards here,
since there is a distinction to be made between a view of
the nation-state as once solid and stable, and now unset-
tled; and a view of it as always contingent, constructed
and potentially unstable. The former view treats the
present situation as a break from the historical certain-
ties of nation-states: instability is seen as a feature of the
current period. The latter view sees those certainties—
Appadurai’s “apparent stability”—as social and political
accomplishments in at least two senses. First, they have
always been constructions in the face of the contending
and conflicting forces that consistently threaten to
destabilise nation-states. Second, they are myths or
imaginaries constructed in the face of the empirical
instabilities of nation-states. The historical experience of
most nation-states has not been that of stable borders,
territorial integrity and a solidified national identity. On
the contrary, borders have proved highly mobile, nations
and states have chopped and changed, and national iden-
tities have been invented, and reinvented, regularly. For
large parts of the world, colonial relations have meant
that all the features supposedly associated with nation-
state formation have been denied or distorted by the
operations of colonial economic, cultural and political
power. Even the “model” European nation-states (and
“Europe” itself) can be usefully viewed as the outcomes
of elaborate and contested processes of construction:
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involving spatial and cultural instabilities, nation-build-
ing and rebuilding, and the occasional war (see, for
example, Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener, 2001;
Fink, Lewis and Clarke, 2001; Hudson and Williams,
1999; Jonsson, Tagil and Tornqvist, 2000). 
These model nation-states were supposedly marked
by “territorial integrity.” However, the integrity of most
European nation-states rested on the critical interpene-
tration of colonial places with metropolitan cores—not a
solidified economic, cultural and political unity, but an
ensemble of dispersed economic, cultural and political
relations that enabled the imaginary of the sovereign,
unified nation-state. This imaginary has been central to
the social sciences. As Sassen puts it: “Much of social
science has operated with the assumption of the nation-
state as a container, representing a unified spatiotempo-
rality. Much of history, however, has failed to confirm
this assumption” (2001: 261). Treating the nation-state
as a unified block gets in the way of understanding how
contemporary processes are reshaping both nations and
states—and unsettling the “hyphen” between nation
and state which naturalizes their conjunction:
That this curiously hyphenated entity, the nation-
state, does not evoke constant surprise is a testimony
to its complete ideological hegemony. Scholarly work
has tended to underestimate seriously the importance
of that hyphen, which simultaneously erases and nat-
uralizes what is surely an incidental coupling….
(Gupta, 1998: 316-7)
In his discussion of the “postcolonial condition,”
Gupta makes elegant use of this “hyphen” between
nation and state—and its destabilization. He argues that
its unsettling reveals the contingently constructed cou-
pling of nation and state, such that they become capable
of being treated (analytically and politically) as separa-
ble. More importantly, he suggests that the unsettling of
the hyphen puts in play new social tensions and forces:
The hyphen between nation and state holds together
a particular bundle of phenomena that are increas-
ingly in tension. It is this that makes the “postcolonial
condition” different from the order of nation-states
brought together by colonialism and nationalism.
(1998: 327)
Within the processes of globalization, we have seen
struggles to abolish nations—and states (in the break-
up of the former Soviet Union); to create, or recreate
nations (from within the former Eastern bloc and in
Africa); to detach nations and “peoples” from states (in
the former Yugoslavia; in Kurdish struggles for auton-
omy); to claim and internalize territory with nations
(e,g., the disputed space of Kashmir) and to dismantle
former unities of nations-and-states (as in the move to
devolution in the United Kingdom). Much of this comes
on top of earlier waves of territorial-political realign-
ments across the relations of the “West and the rest” in
the form of (partial, unfinished) de-colonization and the
consequent insertion of de-colonized nations into the
new global political economy. Such complex and multiple
processes can hardly be grasped in the debate about the
“end of the nation-state.” Rather, we may need to pay
attention to unfinished, partial and conflictual processes
of “unsettling” and attempts at “resettling”—the con-
struction of (temporarily) stabilized new formations.4
Gupta argues that 
What I would like to suggest is that there is a grow-
ing tension between nation and states so that the par-
ticular enclosure that was conjured by their histori-
cally fortuitous conjunction may be slowly falling
apart….The kinds of activities and meanings that
were brought together by nation-states—the regula-
tion of industries, goods and people; the control and
surveillance of populations; the provision of “secu-
rity” with respect to other nation-states…; the
employment of laws; the feeling of belonging to “a
people”; the belief in particular historical narratives
of identity and difference—may be untangling….It is
very likely that they will reconstitute themselves into
different bundles. But it is highly unlikely that the
reconstituted entities will simply be reproduction of
nation-states, writ large or small. (1998: 318). 
The contemporary politics of “welfare reform” take
place on a ground where established conceptions of peo-
ple, nation and state have become unsettled and con-
tested. The unsettling of the nation-state hyphen is
accelerated by the increasing flows of people across bor-
ders and the compound configurations of attachments,
identity and social relations that they construct in those
flows. Migration, tourism, a mobile business class and
nomadism change the relationships between people and
places. Social relations (of family and friendship); identi-
ties (of ethnicity, religion and local-ness) and politico-cul-
tural affinities traverse space—connecting different
places of living and attachment (e.g., Glick Schiller and
Fouron, 2001). For studies of social policy, transnational
“chains of care” are increasingly significant as migrant
women perform waged care work in the West, while
using those wages to support families (and even buy
care) “at home” (e.g., Hochschild, 2001). 
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I have tried to use anthropological conceptions of
globalization and the postcolonial to open up the welfare
state/nation-state complex that is so central to compara-
tive studies of social policy. Thinking of (temporarily)
stabilised formations of nation-state-welfare being
unsettled enables us to see ways through the binary
choice between globalization and nation-states. More
generally, examining these unsettled relationships
between place, people and nation, and nation, state and
welfare allow us to understand why questions of citizen-
ship have become so significant.
Citizenship in Flux
Citizenship is one of the critical sites around which these
instabilities coalesce. This is hardly surprising since cit-
izenship is a status formed in the construction and devel-
opment of hyphenated nation-states and the relation-
ships with their “people.” Citizenship articulates the
twin couplets nation-state and welfare-state. Like the
nation-state, citizenship has been historically “natural-
ized” in a number of ways. It has rested on a taken-for-
granted assumption about the equivalence of the nation-
state, territorial boundaries and “membership” of the
nation—though, as Lewis argues, this nation may be an
“imperial nation” (with “membership” unevenly and dif-
ferentially spread beyond the national space, Lewis,
1998: 135-143). It has typically presumed a natural fit
between nation, people and “race”—treating them as co-
terminous, and mutually reinforcing, categories. It has
also been the site in which “univeralism” and structures
of subordination, marginalization and exclusion have
been articulated (see, inter alia, Lewis, 1998; Lister,
1997). The white, male, able-bodied, wage-earning sub-
ject has been the typical “universal citizen” of Western
welfare capitalism—the “independent” figure able to
claim and enact legal, political and social rights. Around
him are a range of structurally differentiated “incom-
plete” subjects (placed by age, gender, disability and
“race”-ethnicity-nationality) whose access to citizenship
and its rights is more conditional, marginal secondary—
or who may simply be excluded.
Not surprisingly, then, citizenship is a highly con-
tested status (Lister, 1997). It has been the focus of
struggles within nation-states that have challenged the
rights and services it provides and that have challenged
the conditions of “membership.” The former have
sought to extend, increase and enrich the rights of citi-
zens and the substance of the benefits and services to
which citizenship provides access (from improved and
less conditional benefits through to adequate standards
of care and support). The latter have sought to redefine
who is entitled to be counted as a citizen—extending the
social range of “universalism” to those marginalized,
excluded or subordinated by dominant definitions (and,
in the process, transforming the substance of the “uni-
versal”). For these struggles, the imagery of “second
class citizens” has been a powerful rhetorical figure for
defining and challenging inequalities and the practices
of discriminatory subordination. In practice, struggles
over the content of welfare and over membership both
overlap and lead to further innovation in the conception
of what welfare might or should mean (see, for example,
Williams, 2000). For example, challenges from the dis-
ability movement around “independence” contain a
struggle about membership and conflicts over the level,
conditions and character of benefits and services, while
raising new possibilities about what the “independent
and autonomous” citizen, so central to liberal theory,
might mean in practice (Shakespeare, 2000). 
These continuing challenges (and the resistances to
them) have intersected with the cultural and political
forces brought into play by the instabilities around the
“hyphenated” nation-state. At least three dimensions
stand out in this process. The first centres on the tension
between nation-states and other levels of governance in
sub- and supra-national institutions and processes (see,
inter alia, Clarke, 2001b; Delanty, 2000; and Geyer,
2000). Questions of membership, authority and rights
are now posed in and across multiple settings—allowing
the possibility of challenges being mounted “beyond”
the nation-state (for example, through the European
Union and the European Court of Human Rights). The
“internalization” of European Human Rights legislation
within the legal systems of member-states provides a
further instance of the shifting relations of “inside and
outside” of nation-states. Some authors have posed the
question of whether forms of “transnational citizenship”
are imaginable at the point where new institutional
jurisdictions coincide with migration, mobility and
“detachment” from the singular territory of a nation-
state (Delanty, 2000; Soysal, 1994). Ong’s exploration of
“flexible citizenship” in the Chinese diaspora raises
question about how people negotiate multiple attach-
ments in a world in which formations of nation, state,
capital and family are being realigned—often into new
combinations characterized by what Althusser called
“teeth-gritting harmony.” 
The second dimension focuses on the conflicts
between varieties of mutli-culturalism and varieties of
nationalism in the struggle over national identity within
and beyond the nation-state (see, inter alia, Calhoun,
1997; Cohen, 1999; Hesse, 2000a). The conjunction of
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postcolonialism (or what Hesse calls the “unrealized,
incomplete and interrupted postcolonial settlements,”
2000b: 13) and multiple migrations creates an “identity
problem” within nations and states (see, for example,
Parekh, 2000; and the Home Office, 2001). This issue is
variously named as “diversity,” “inclusion,” “cohesion,”
“difference,” “multiethnicity” and “multiculturalism”
(Hall, 2000; Lewis, 2000b). This identity problem—the
unsettling of the naturalized equivalences between
nation, people and race—is the site of intense conflicts as
the trajectory from the colonial to the postcolonial meets
old and new migrations. The challenges posed by such
changes encounter attempted reconciliations around the
liberal democratic imaginary of British/European “toler-
ance” and a “modern” sensibility of pluralism (see, for
example, Baubock, Heller and Zolberg, 1996, on plural-
ism and Marfleet, 1999, on views of Europe as “civilizing
force”). Gupta argues that the unsettling of the hyphen-
ated nation-state is the site for regressive political-cul-
tural projects:
To suggest that the particular historical conjuncture
that brought “nation” and “state” together into a sta-
ble form of spatial organization may be coming to an
end is not to argue that forms of “nation-ness” and
“state-ness” are in danger of disappearing altogether.
New, more menacing, racially exclusionary forms of
national identity are emerging in Europe and the
United States, for example (1998: 319; see also Cas-
tles, 2000; and Cohen, 1999).
The third dimension hinges on the tension between
the “withdrawal” or “retreat” of the state, and the
increasing claims to citizenship and citizenship rights.
The developments discussed in the preceding para-
graphs have created growing demands for and of citi-
zenship. New claims are being made upon states to rec-
ognize “other” citizens and their needs/rights, alongside
pressures to deliver adequate levels of benefits and
services in appropriate forms. These claims encounter
the state’s wish to create more autonomous, independ-
ent, active or self-provisioning citizens. Neo-liberal, neo-
conservative and communitarian discourses share a con-
cern to reduce the state’s “interference” in the workings
of markets, families and communities. Blom Hansen and
Stepputat have drawn attention to the paradox “that
while the authority of the state is being constantly ques-
tioned and functionally undermined, there are growing
pressures to confer full-fledged rights and entitlements
on ever more citizens” (2001: 2). One effect is that bene-
fits and services, in the Anglophone countries especially,
become the targets for new practices of rationing, new
forms of conditionality, and programs of devolution,
decentralization and privatization. Similarly “citizens”
are the focus of attempts to “remake” them as responsi-
ble parents, active citizens and flexible workers (U.S.
experiences are well surveyed in Goode and
Maskovsky, 2001). Simultaneously, the shift to more
“mixed” or “plural” economies of welfare provision dis-
perses, and may fragment, the agencies responsible for
organizing and delivering welfare—putting them “at
arm’s length” from the state (Clarke and Newman, 1997;
Hoggett, 1996). In the process—and despite the
demands of citizens and would-be citizens—the state
becomes more elusive and more evasive in relation to
the social or welfare rights of citizens (an arm’s length
being about the distance of deniability). The withdrawal
of the state is not just about formal arrangements or a
generalized reduction in provisioning—it has specific
social dynamics that transfer costs, pressures and
responsibilities in unequal ways (Clarke and Newman,
1997: 141-59; see Kingfisher, 2002, on the gendered
dynamics of neo-liberal welfare “reform”). In these dif-
ferent ways, citizenship (as the point of articulation
between nation-state-welfare) remains one of the cen-
tral sites of current political and cultural conflict.
Unsettling Conversations
In this article I have tried to use encounters with anthro-
pology to aid the process of rethinking conventional
views of the relationship between globalization and wel-
fare states. The idea of “unsettling” plays a double role in
this process. It reflects the orientation of anthropological
writing on globalization and nation-states that escapes
the confines of a binary categorization of the global and
the national. This concern with the destabilization or
unsettling of previously taken-for-granted formations of
nation, state (and, I would add, welfare) is profoundly
important for thinking through the contradictory ten-
dencies that both contribute to, and are put in play in, the
unsettling of welfare states/nation-states. It also enables
us to think about the different projects that aim to reset-
tle or realign people, welfare and states in new forma-
tions. But secondly, the process of academic border-
crossing (to borrow from anthropologists) is itself
“unsettling”—in that it destabilizes foundational con-
cepts in the “home” discipline. Social policy has worked
with ideas of the “welfare state,” underpinned by the
nation-state model. Unsettling those conceptual forma-
tions is a core part of “rethinking” the subject, and is
aided by trans-disciplinary encounters. 
For me, the (selective) encounter with anthropology
has three very valuable outcomes. The first is the
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capacity to rethink the welfare state/nation-state com-
plex in a shifting global context, without being caught
by either apocalyptic political-economy or inertial polit-
ical-institutional analysis. The second is that anthropol-
ogy’s insistence on the local and the particular breaks
up the persistent enthusiasm of social scientists for
“grand narratives”—whether globalization, neo-liberal-
ism, individualization or modernization. Attention to the
particular clearly does not deny transnational, interna-
tional or supra-national processes, but it does require
thinking about how they are enacted, instantiated and
lived (Lem and Leach, 2002). In terms of “welfare
reform,” for example, attention to the particular can
illuminate the diverse incarnations of an apparently
coherent political strategy (see Kingfisher, 2002, on
neo-liberal welfare reform). The particular can also
reveal some of the incoherence, contradictions and ten-
sions of dominant strategies (see, for example, Hyatt,
2001, on the recruitment of “active citizens”). Finally,
the particular can allow us to see some of the refusals,
resistance and recalcitrance that are in play when sub-
jects are summoned by power. This is, I hope, not a
romantic view of resistance as counter-politics, but a
concern with the limits and limitations of dominant
strategies. New subjects do not always come when they
are called. Indeed, they might not hear the call, they
might not recognize themselves as its subject, or they
might just answer back in a different voice (see Holland
and Lave, 2001, on dialogism and contentious prac-
tices). When I go back to social policy, this is the “good
sense” of anthropology that I want to take with me. But
the third outcome of these encounters is a commitment
to staying mobile—to creating the conditions for more
“unsettling” conversations because of the ways in which
they help us to think—and to think again.
John Clarke, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University,
Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, U.K. E-mail:
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Notes
1 In this and other respects, this article draws on collabora-
tive work with my colleagues at the Open University
which places a premium on “rethinking” (see, for example,
Lewis, Gewirtz and Clarke, 2000; and Fink, Lewis and
Clarke, 2002). This article was originally a paper for a
panel, organized by Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff
Maskovsky at the CASCA/SANA conference in 2002 at
the University of Windsor. I am grateful to the organizers
and other session participants (Karen Brodsky, Dana-Ain
Davis and Ida Susser) and many other people at the con-
ference for making the “border crossing” a rewarding
experience. Finally, the positive and thoughtful comments
from the Anthropologica reviewers helped with the revi-
sion of the paper to this form.
2 The significance of this cluster is reflected in recent stud-
ies of neo-liberalism and welfare that have foregrounded
combinations of Anglophone nations (Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the U.K. and U.S.)—see, for example,
Kingfisher (2002), O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999) and
Peck (2001). There are, however, problems about general-
izing about neo-liberalism as a project from these exam-
ples, since other welfare systems reveal different political
formations and trajectories (see, for example, Alcock and
Craig, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Kuhnle, 2000 and
Sykes, Palier and Prior, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). The
blurring of boundaries between national, international
and transnational formations poses significant challenges
for the comparative analysis of welfare states, given its
conventional focus on nation-states.
3 In the analysis of globalization, many writers have argued
for the importance of distinguishing “neo-liberal global-
ization” from other globalizing processes and relation-
ships. Neo-liberalism forms a distinctive strategy for
global economic realignment and for the reform of
national political institutions, including the welfare/state
relationship. There are some commonalities here between
political economy views of neo-liberalism (as the institu-
tional incarnation of global capital) and post-structural-
ist/Foucauldian views of neo-liberal governmentality. Both
tend to abstract the “pure form” from its practice in par-
ticular settings. Neo-liberalism is rarely enacted as a pure
form—rather it takes political shape in compound forms
(Clarke, 2001c; O’Malley, forthcoming; see also Kingfisher,
2002). Viewing welfare state reform only from the strate-
gic standpoint of neo-liberalism obscures vital alliances,
resistances and contradictions in the project of welfare
state reform. Programs of “welfare reform” in the U.S.
and the U.K., for example, indicate the importance of look-
ing at neo-liberalism’s articulations with neo-conser-
vatism, particularly around the intersection of welfare and
racialised and gendered formations. The U.K. example
suggests exploring the ways in which neo-liberalism is
articulated with both “residual” and “emergent” forms of
social democracy (Clarke, 2004).
4 I have added the idea of “unsettling” to those of “untan-
gling” or “unbundling” partly because recent work around
welfare states has made use of the idea of “settlements”
and the ways in which they have become unsettled (see, for
example, Clarke and Newman, 1997; Hughes and Lewis,
1998; Lister, 2002). However, it also captures something of
the dynamic view of the state expressed in Gramsci’s con-
ception of a “series of unstable equilibria,” which I have
found valuable as a way of thinking about the achievement
of (apparent) stability and its capacity for falling apart.
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